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competitive effects of Penn-Olin were to be utilized, a Rule of Reason
would have to be read into section 7. Otherwise, a literal reading of the Act
would surely have striken the joint venture to the detriment of the competitive
health of the relevant market.
WILLIAM J. MCDONALD
Antitrust—Clayton Act—Preliminary Injunction Seeking to Enjoin
Proposed Conglomerate Acquisition.—United States v. Food Mach.
Corp.'—The United States, proceeding in the District Court for the Northern
District of California under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 2 sought a pre-
liminary injunction against Food Machinery Corporation (FMC), and
American Viscose Corporation (Avisco), to enjoin the consummation of a
proposed acquisition of a substantial part of the assets of Avisco by FMC.a
Due to the decline of rayon and acetate in favor of new synthetic fibres, the
board of directors of Avisco considered that its shareholders would realize
the value of their investment only if the corporation's diminishing assets,
utilized in the production of cellulosic fiber (rayon and acetate) and
cellulosic film (cellophane), were sold to a willing buyer. Avisco com-
menced negotiations with FMC which culminated in a contract of Jan-
uary 31, 1963, for the sale of Avisco assets on June 28, 1963. FMC, a
widely diversified industrial company, which has never engaged in the fiber
or film industries, desires to acquire the assets of Avisco in order to gain
entry into the chemical fiber and film industries (nylon, orlon, dacron and
polyethylene). Although the United States sought to label the contemplated
acquisition vertical or horizontal, it was characterized by the court as con-
glomerate,4
 because it lacked the aspects of the former categories!' After
of the acquiring company and in the adjustments of other companies operating
in the markets directly affected, and (4) probable long-range differences that the
acquisition may make for companies actually or potentially operating in these
markets. Attorney General, supra note 9, at 125.
1 218 F. Supp. 817 (ND. Cal. 1963).
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
a The court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in accordance with the
provisions of Section 15 of the Clayton Act which empowers a district court to "make
such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises"
pending final decision. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958). In addition to the
various agencies specifically charged with enforcement of the Act, the Department of
Justice has broad equity powers to seek relief enjoining violation of any part of the
Act. The injunctive relief in this case is sought under the above authority.
4 Congress has described conglomerate mergers as "those in which there is no
discernible relationship in the nature of business between the acquiring and acquired
firms." H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
5 There were no horizontal aspects because FMC and Avisco had not competed in
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departing from its theory that this acquisition may substantially lessen com-
petition in the manufacture and sale of rayon (because there was no evidence
before the court to sustain the proposition), the government introduced
affidavits and evidence attempting to prove a reasonable probability that the
conglomerate acquisition of these assets may substantially lessen compe-
tition in the sale of packaging machinery used by converters of cellophane.°
In denying the motion for injunction, the court HELD: A preliminary
injunction was not warranted under the affidavits and evidence which were
largely speculative and which did not meet the reasonable probability test
of substantial lessening of competition.
Recent case law in the area of anti-merger litigation proscribed by
section 7 indicates that in lieu of divestiture—an equitable antitrust remedy
ordinarily employed subsequent to the completion of an improper merger—a
court will grant an interlocutory injunction enjoining the consummation of
a proposed merger under certain circumstances. The injunction has been
granted where the government has sustained its burden of proving a reason-
able probability of a substantial lessening of competition in any line of
commerce!
The government has sustained its burden of proof in two recent non-
conglomerate cases in which preliminary injunctions were granted. In
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 8 the lower court's finding that the
defendant corporation, by acquiring other companies engaged in manufac-
turing coal mining machinery, would tend to create a monopoly by elimi-
nating competition enjoyed by other companies in that line of commerce
was sustained on appeal as a proscribed "vertical" acquisition with anti-
competitive effects reasonably probable. The automatic effect of foreclosing
to competitors a market outlet or source of supply, present in a vertical
merger even prior to consummation, enabled the government to sustain its
burden. Without indulging in mere speculation, it was able to show that a
the manufacture and sale of any product, and FMC would be merely substituted as
a competitor. No vertical aspects were present because no customer-supplier relation-
ship existed. Avisco had not sold products to FMC and did not manufacture any
products needed by it. Although FMC sold two products (carbon bisulfide and caustic
soda) to Avisco, the products were essentially incidental and de minimis in relation to
the entire transaction. Supra note 1.
One of the principal lines of machinery produced by FMC is its packaging equip-
ment, including wrapping machinery for packages to be covered with cellophane or
other films. Supra note 1, at 818.
7 A merger characterized as "vertical," which usually has the automatic effect of
foreclosing to competitors any market outlet or source of supply, or as "horizontal,"
characterized by automatically eliminating a competitor, presents less difficulty to
the government in sustaining its burden of proof than does the "conglomerate" ac-
quisition or merger since such automatic effects are not present. Nevertheless, the
language of the statute and relevant legislative history indicate that a conglomerate
merger violates section 7 if it has the proscribed effect. The House Committee report
stated:
lTlhe bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and
conglomerate as well as horizontal, which have the specified effects of sub-
stantially lessening competition . . . or tending to create a monopoly.
Supra note 4.
8 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
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lessening of competition was probable in the future. United States v. Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank° involved a "horizontal" merger where the court held
that it was reasonably probable that the proposed merger of the second
and third largest Philadelphia banks, resulting in a single bank's controlling
at least thirty per cent of the commercial banking business in a four-county
metropolitan area, would substantially lessen competition so that the merger
was forbidden by the Clayton Act and was required to be enjoined. Elimina-
tion of a competitor is the automatic effect present in a horizontal merger
even prior to consummation. By introducing evidence of this effect, the
government was able to hurdle the unsteady,
 ground of speculation and show
probability of anti-competitive effects.
However, where the government fails to sustain its burden of proving
reasonable probability, the court will refuse to enjoin the proposed merger
or acquisition. In United States v. Gimble Bros. Inc.," a preliminary in-
junction against the consummation of a proposed merger of two Milwaukee
department store chains was denied where the court found, on the affidavits
submitted, that the proposed merger would not probably substantially lessen
competition in retail merchandising in Milwaukee County but, in fact, would
probably not lessen competition at all. In United States v. Continental Can
Co. 11 where the government sought to enjoin a proposed "conglomerate"
acquisition of corporate manufacturer of glass containers by corporate manu-
facturer of metal and plastic containers on the ground that such acquisition
would substantially lessen competition, the court held that there was no
proof of any reasonable probability of such substantial anti-competitive effects
either in the relevant product markets or in any other product markets as
a result of corporate acquisition, and denied the government's motion for
injunction against consummation of the acquisition.
In order to make out a case under section 7, the government is required
to show either that the acquisition had actually resulted in a significant
diminution of the vigor of competition or that there was reasonable
probability that it would do so." Unless it shows that there are actual
anti-competitive effects of a substantial nature, which cannot be done prior
to the consummation of a proposed merger, the reasonable probability test
has to be met. In establishing reasonable probability, it is usually necessary
to define lines of commerce in which the acquired company was engaged and
the section of the country affected in determining whether anti-competitive
effects or tendency to monopolize are reasonably probable. The test is
whether the acquisition will have demonstrable anti-competitive effects in any
relevant product market in any section of the country." Thus, under this
test, the government has the burden of proof of delineating relevant product
markets or submarkets in which it claims that competition would be adversely
° 374 U.S. 321 (1963). For a discussion of the 1950 amendments to Section 7 of
the Clayton Act expanding its scope to include hank mergers, see Note, 5 B.C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 175 (1963).
10 202 F. Supp. 779 (ED. 1Vis. 1962).
11 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
12 Id. at 783.
13 United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
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affected by acquisition and sections of the country that would be affected.
In addition, the government must establish that in one or more such markets
or submarkets in any particular section or sections of the country there is
a reasonable probability of unlawful anti-competitive effects or of a tendency
to create a monopoly." In United States v. Brown Shoe Co.," the first
definitive interpretation of section 7 by the Supreme Court since amended
in 1950, it was indicated that this same test would apply to conglomerate
mergers or acquisitions as well as to any other matter coming within the
purview of section 7 (mergers having vertical or horizontal aspects).
Since the automatic effects of a vertical or horizontal merger are not
present in a conglomerate transaction," the government's burden is neces-
sarily difficult to meet, if it can be met at all prior to the consummation of
the merger. Evidence relating solely to the competitive situation existing
in the relevant market prior to the consummation of a conglomerate merger
is speculative and without the above-mentioned automatic effects, such
evidence can hardly move into the more solid ground of probability. But
this does not mean that the government's burden is lessened. It is not
relieved from the obligation of establishing relevant product markets or of
showing reasonable probability of substantial anti-competitive effects in
one or more of them as a result of the acquisition. This difficulty of market
analysis in the conglomerate merger does not excuse the government from
proving the proscribed effects of section 7 in accordance with the recognized
test." Since such effects are difficult to ascertain, and even if ascertainable,
are always speculative prior to consummation," it seems impossible to find a
violation in a conglomerate transaction before the acquisition has long been
completed and the actual effects have been observed, 19 and even then the
government's burden is difficult. However, actual anti-competitive effects
are ascertainable from a consideration of post-acquisition factors. In a
recent conglomerate merger, Procter & Gamble acquired the assets of Clorox,
the leading producer of household liquid bleach. On rehearing the FTC
introduced into evidence various marketing reports showing a substantial
lessening of competition in the liquid bleach industry. Procter & Gamble's
ability to command consumer acceptance of its products and of valuable
grocery store shelf space, as well as its ability to concentrate the full impact
14 Supra note 11.
15 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Comment, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 159 (1962).
15 In the Matter of Procter & Gamble Co., 1961-1963 CCH F.T.C. Complaints and
Orders, t 15245, at 20257 (transfer binder, June 15, 1961).
17 In the Continental Can Co. case, supra note 11, the court said that reasonable
probability of a lessening of competition in the future is just as much subject to
evidentiary proof as Is actual lessening of competition. Mere speculation or conjecture
cannot be substituted for proof of reasonable probability. Nor are mere possibilities
that competition might be lessened in the future, or inferences to that effect, sufficient.
18 This is so since the conglomerate acquisition does not have the "automatic"
effects of a vertical or horizontal merger. Supra note 7.
19 The first time a conglomerate acquisition case was before the Federal Trade
Commission, it was remanded for additional evidence. The Commission determined
that not even a sixteen month period following the acquisition of a dominant house-
hold liquid bleach firm by a leading soap and detergent manufacturer was sufficiently
long to ascertain the market effects. Supra note 16.
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of its advertising, promotional and merchandising experience into the liquid
bleach field, had so enhanced the dominant market position held by Clorox
prior to the merger as to be detrimental to the actual and potential com-
petition by such products as those of Purex, the second largest producer of
liquid bleach. 2°
In the present case, the government was not able to sustain its burden
of reasonable probability. Its case was based on what it claimed to be anti-
competitive effects which might occur in the future. It is a far cry from
might occur to a reasonable probability of occurring. Unless the recognized
"reasonably probable" test of matter coming within the purview of section 7
is to be changed when conglomerate acquisitions are involved,21 it is diffi-
cult to see how the government may ever succeed in its motion for a pre-
liminary injunction enjoining the consummation of a proposed conglomerate
acquisition.
The court takes pains to indicate that the present case is novel in that
it marks the first instance in which the Department of Justice has brought
an action to restrain a conglomerate acquisition prior to consummation 22
The statement is inaccurate in view of the Continental Can Co. case in
which the Department of Justice sought a preliminary injunction in a
conglomerate acquisition. 23 Thus, rather than being a case of first impression
as the court indicates, it follows, as a definitive pronouncement, a new trend
in the relatively recent series of conglomerate acquisitions where preliminary
injunctions are denied. However, this decision is singularly unique in that
it portends a policy of denial by the courts of motions for preliminary in-
junctions seeking to enjoin proposed conglomerate acquisitions. This policy
is necessarily correct since the evidence of substantial lessening of competi-
tion will be speculative and will not meet the recognized test of anti-compet-
itive effects. However, the government's predicament is not to be viewed
with great alarm. A consideration of the legislative intent and the mandate
of section 7 indicates that only those mergers or acquisitions having demon-
strable anti-competitive effects are proscribed. There is no proscription of
20 In the Matter of Procter & Gamble Co., 1961-1963 F.T.C. Complaints and
Orders, 3 Trade Reg. Rep., II 16,673, at 21,558 (Dec. 15, 1963). The Commission ordered
Procter & Gamble to divest itself of all assets of Clorox.
21 A suggested test for proposed conglomerate mergers or acquisitions, based solely
on equitable principles would appear to be whether the corporations involved would
be irreparably harmed by the injunction pending final decision. If not, then the court
would grant the motion for preliminary injunction, disregarding the speculative nature
of the government's contentions as to the proscribed effects of section 7. However,
application of this and similar tests, which are not based upon an investigation into
market structure and into the effects of the merger on competition, would be inherently
opposed to acquisitions per se and contra to the legislative intent of section 7 which
is to proscribe only those acquisitions having demonstrable anti-competitive effects.
For an insight into the adverse effects of a non-economic test, see Comment, 72 Yale
L.J. 1265, 1280 (1963).
22 Supra note 1, at 818.
23 Supra note 11. In this case, although the government, as in the instant case,
attempted to label the proposed acquisition as vertical or horizontal, the court charac-
terized it as "basically a conglomerate combination," and because the government had
not sustained its burden of proving a reasonable probability of substantial lessening of
competition, its motion for injunction was denied.
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mergers per se, although such a proscription would be a necessary con-
clusion if the test of anti-competitive effects were one of speculation
and possibility. The existing test of reasonable probability recognizes
that section 7 is not concerned with possibilities. If the government
has not met its burden of showing the reasonable probability of a sub-
stantial lessening of competition, the conglomerate merger should not
be enjoined on the basis of speculative claims. Should investigation into
post-acquisition factors indicate that the proscribed effects exist or will
likely exist in the future, divestiture would be an adequate remedy?' To
grant the motion for injunction would be to substitute what are at best mere
ephemeral possibilities for reasonable probabilities.
GEORGE M. FORD
Antitrust—Clayton Act—Stock Exchange Held Liable under Antitrust
Laws.—Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.' —The New York Stock Ex-
change directed certain of its member firms to terminate private wire con-
nections with the petitioners who were registered broker-dealers= in over-the-
counter municipal bonds, without assigning any reason therefor or giving
the petitioners notice or an opportunity to be heard. The ensuing inability to
receive instantaneous market quotations caused a sharp drop in petitioner's
business. In consequence thereof, a suit was brought in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York° alleging that the
arbitrary action of the Exchange constituted a conspiracy in violation of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act* thereby entitling petitioners to treble
damages and injunctive relief? The district court held that antitrust laws
applied to the Exchange and granted partial summary judgment, per-
manently enjoining it from interfering with private wire connections between
its members and the petitioner.° On appeal the Second Circuit reversed, hold-
24 Supra note 20.
1 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
2 They were registered with the SEC as broker/dealers pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 780(b) (1958). They were also
members of the National Association of Security Dealers, but were not members of the
New York Stock Exchange.
3 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
4 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. 1, 2 (1958). Petitioners alleged two additional
causes of action which sounded in tort, based upon allegations that the Exchange
tortiously induced its members to breach contracts for wire connections with petitioners
and also that the Exchange caused petitioners intentional and wrongful harm without
reasonable cause.,
5 These forms of relief are provided by the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15
U.S.C. 15, 26 (1958).
6 Supra note 3. The district court rejected the Exchange's contention that the scheme
of the Act of 1934 was complete regulation and control of all matters relating to
securities transactions and that as a registered Exchange it was therefore part of a
regulated industry exempt from the antitrust laws, at least as to all the rules filed with
the SEC. See note 11, infra.
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